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Abstract—This paper considers security risks buried in the
data processing pipeline in common deep learning applications.
Deep learning models usually assume a fixed scale for their
training and input data. To allow deep learning applications to
handle a wide range of input data, popular frameworks, such as
Caffe, TensorFlow, and Torch, all provide data scaling functions
to resize input to the dimensions used by deep learning models.
Image scaling algorithms are intended to preserve the visual
features of an image after scaling. However, common image
scaling algorithms are not designed to handle human crafted
images. Attackers can make the scaling outputs look dramatically
different from the corresponding input images.
This paper presents a downscaling attack that targets the data
scaling process in deep learning applications. By carefully crafting
input data that mismatches with the dimension used by deep
learning models, attackers can create deceiving effects. A deep
learning application effectively consumes data that are not the
same as those presented to users. The visual inconsistency enables
practical evasion and data poisoning attacks to deep learning
applications. This paper presents proof-of-concept attack samples
to popular deep-learning-based image classification applications.
To address the downscaling attacks, the paper also suggests
multiple potential mitigation strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning applications are continuously gaining popu-
larity in both academic and industry in recent years. Advances
in GPUs and deep learning algorithms along with large datasets
allow deep learning algorithms to address real-world problems
in many areas, from image classification, health care predic-
tion, auto game playing, to reverse engineering.
Along with this increasing popularity comes with new
security concerns to deep learning applications. Data poisoning
attacks [1, 4], such as mixing mislabeled data or polluted
samples in training datasets, have drawn substantive attention.
Researchers [10, 16] have shown that deep learning applica-
tions, such as imaging recognition and self-driving, can be
manipulated to make wrong decisions on benign inputs due to
data poisoning.
In practice, data poisoning attacks are not the main concern
to deep learning application developers and users. One possible
reason is that users often believe the risk can be largely
mitigated by having human carefully inspect the training data.
Using image classification applications as examples, people
generally believe they can visually detect those mislabelled
images (e.g. having a human verify an image label by looking
at it).
This paper presents downscaling attacks, which target a
security risk buried in the data processing pipeline of deep
learning applications. Downscaling attacks take advantage of
a limitation in the data flow processing in deep learning
applications – deep learning model are typically trained on
well formatted data. For design simplicity, most deep learning
applications use fixed size input scales. The designer of deep
neural networks assume both training data and application
inputs fall on the same scale. In practice, many deep learning
applications often need to deal with inputs that are formatted
in different scales. Arbitrary inputs therefore need to be resized
to the model scale in order to be used by the deep learning
neural network. To support this particular need, popular deep
learning frameworks all offer rescaling functions; and for most
deep learning applications we examined, data rescaling is a
common component in their data processing pipeline.
In a downscaling attack, attackers feed input images con-
taining camouflage data to a deep learning application. The
camouflage data are arranged in an input image such that they
will be filtered or changed by the scaling algorithm. The result
is an image with a different visual presentation being fed to the
application’s deep learning neural network. Consequently this
attack creates visually deceiving effect and potentially allows
attackers to launch more practical data poisoning and evasion
attacks [1, 4, 11, 13, 20].
In the paper, we investigate the common scaling implemen-
tations in three popular deep learning frameworks: Caffe [9],
TensorFlow [7], and Torch [15]. We find that all the default
data scaling algorithms are vulnerable to the downscaling
attack. Attackers can injects poisoning or deceiving data to
training samples or input data. The injected camouflaged data
are visible to users but are discarded by scaling functions,
and thus these data are eventually not used by deep learning
algorithms. For example, a human considers an image (with
camouflage) only contains sheep, but the image becomes a
picture of wolf after rescaling. For deep learning applications
that take the camouflaged sheep image, it would be the wolf
image eventually being proceeded by applications.
This paper describes our preliminary study on the threat
related to data scaling, and we provide proof of concept
inputs to illustrate the potential danger of downscaling attacks.
Through our preliminary study of the commonly used scaling
options in deep learning applications, we make the following
contributions:
• This paper presents a preliminary study of the data scaling
options in popular deep learning frameworks.
• We find that data scaling is actually a common need in
deep learning applications.
• We show the risk of downscaling attacks is real, and
we provide multiple proof-of-concept images targeting
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popular deep learning applications.
• To reduce the potential threats from downscaling attacks,
we offer a few mitigation strategies, such as input fil-
tering, robust scaling implementations, and downscaling
attack detections.
II. DOWNSCALING ATTACK EXAMPLES
To illustrate the potential risks and the deceiving effect of
downscaling attacks, we present a few sample attack inputs in
this section.
Figure 1 presents the first group of examples that were
crafted for image classification applications. The targeted ap-
plication used here is the cppclassification[8] sample released
along with the Caffe framework.
To show the effect of these images on deep learning
applications, we used the GoogleNet model provided by the
BAIR lab of BVLC [6], which assumes the input data is in
the scale of 224*224. When an image with a different size
is provided, the application uses the resize() function in the
Caffe framework to rescale the input to the size used by the
model (224*224). The exact classification setup details and the
program output are presented in the appendix of this paper.
Fig. 1: Two Examples Showing Sample Effect of Downscale-
ing Attack. (Left-side: What Human See; Right-side: What ML
Models See)
We specially crafted input images that are in a different
size (224*672). The images on the left column of Figure 1 are
inputs to deep learning applications. The images on the right
column are the output of the scaling function, and thus are the
effective images used by the deep learning algorithms.
While the input on the left column are sheep, the deep
learning model takes the images on the right column as the real
inputs. The corresponding image are classified into instances
of “White Wolf” and “lynx Cat” respectively.
TABLE I: PoC Sample Image Information
Image File MD5 Checksum Image Size
wolf-in-
sheep.png
fce6aa3c1b03ca4ae3289f5be22e7e65 224*672
wolf.png ed2d62fbb8720d802c250fb386c254f6 224*224
cat-in-
sheep.png
6d489fe75f74ad32e8ada01ff7da9450 224*672
cat.png 01820651a302fb3730ac0a5ffd95c23c 224*224
Fig. 2: Four pairs of Downscaling attack examples for the
MNIST application (Within each pair, left-side: What Human
See; right-side: What ML Models See)
Figure 2 shows the attack examples using the MNIST
handwriting digits recognition [21] as the target application.
Four pairs of images are presented in this figure. Within each
pair, the crafted inputs (visible to human) are in the left column
and the scaling results (visible to models) are in the right
column. The figure shows that the images of digits change
dramatically after the scaling call.
III. DATA SCALING AND DEEP LEARNING APPLICATIONS
Data scaling is not limited to images, and various re-
sampling approaches can be applied to voice and other types
of data. For simplicity, this paper focuses on the scaling effort
for image data. Image scaling refers to the resizing of a
digital image [19]. When scaling an image, the downscaling
(or upscaling) process generates a new image with a lower (or
higher) number of pixels compared to the original image. In
the case of decreasing the pixel number (downscaling), this
usually results in a visible quality loss.
A. The Practical Need of Rescaling
Although scaling is not a necessary component for deep
learning algorithms, data scaling is actually quite common in
deep learning applications. First, open-input applications, such
as image classifications as an Internet service, would have to
involve scaling in their data processing pipeline. For design
simplicity and manageable training process, a deep learning
neural network model usually handles a fixed scale input size.
Although a deep learning neural network can be designed with
layers that take the largest possible scale among all possible
inputs, this approach is inefficient in terms both training and
classification.
For those deep learning applications that take input data
from a fixed input source, such as sensors like video camera,
the input data format are naturally uniform. Even in such
situation, resize is used in certain cases.
One common situation we observe is the use of pre-
trained model. For example, NVIDIA offers multiple self-
driving sample models [5], and all these models use an input
size 200x66. However, on the recommended camera [12] spec-
ification provided by NVIDIA, the image generated are mostly
of the size 1928x1208. Therefore, for system developers that
do not want to design and train their own models, they are
likely have to use scaling functions somewhere in their data
processing pipeline. Recent research work, such as the sample
applications used in the study of DeepXplore [14], also show
that the resizing operation is commonly used in self-driving
applications to fit camera output size to the size of models.
B. Data Scaling in Deep Learning Image Applications
Most deep learning frameworks provide data scaling func-
tions. We examine the sample programs come with popular
deep learning frameworks, such as Tensorflow, Caffe, and
Torch, and we found many programs call scaling functions in
their data processing pipelines. For example, we found that the
image classification application cppclassification [8] in Caffe
framework uses data scale in function Classifier::Preprocess.
Both C++ and Python image recognition demo using Tensor-
flow use function ResizeBilinear for data scaling[17]. Torch7
and PyTorch are also using data scaling in their tutorials [2,
18]. The corresponding code snippets are provided in the
Appendix.
Besides examples from popular deep learning frame-
works, we also found popular deep learning tools, such
as deepdetect[3], use data scaling in their data processing
pipeline.
TABLE II: Data scale algorithm in deep learning frameworks
DL
Framework
Library Default Scal-
ing Algorithm
Caffe opencv Bilinear
Tensorflow python-opencv Bilinear
Tensorflow pillow Neareast
Tensorflow tf.image Bilinear
Torch torch-opencv Bilinear
Torch lua.image Bilinear
C. Image Scaling Algorithms in Deep Learning Frameworks
Image scaling is a well studied field, and there exist
multiple approaches when scaling an image from one size to
another. The most common used algorithms include Nearest-
Neighbors, Bilinear, and Bicubic interpolation [19].
The nearest-neighbor interpolation algorithm uses a rela-
tively simple approach. It uses the value of the nearest point in
the scaling process. To take neighboring points into consider-
ation, linear interpolation approach uses a mathematical mean
to represent a region. Image is often considered as 2D data,
and bilinear approach is an extension of linear interpolation
on a 2D grid.
Most of deep learning frameworks use bilinear interpo-
lation as the default data scale algorithm. We inspected the
implementation of scaling functions in deep learning frame-
works. Table II shows the data scale algorithms used by Caffe,
TensorFlow and Torch. Most frameworks support Nearest-
Neighbors, Bilinear, Bicubic algorithms along with a few
others depends on the specific framework.
IV. THE DOWNSCALING ATTACK
This section provides an overview of the downscaling
attack method against deep learning image applications.
A. The Attack Goal and Constraints
The intent of image scaling algorithms is to adjust the
image size while preserve visual features after scaling. The
purpose of downscaling attack is to create effect against this
intent. A downscaling attack is to craft images that produce
downscaled outputs with dramatic visual differences from the
inputs.
Although scaling in either direction (up and down scaling)
could result in distortions and potentially deceiving effect, we
only discuss the downscaling functions in this paper.
We can consider the scaling effect as a function F, which
convert a source image in a m ∗ n dimension (in[m][n]) to a
new image in different scale (out[m′][n′]).
F (in[m][n]) = out[m′][n′](m′ <= m,n′ <= n) (1)
Although not all downscaling attacks need to generate
a specific image, for simplicity of discussion, we consider
the following attack goal – Given a specific image target, a
successful downscaling attack need to meet the following three
constraints:
1) The attacker needs to compose an image
(crftImg[m][n]) so that the output of
F (crftImg[m][n]) is the target Image (dstImg[m′][n′]);
2) The crafted image crftImg[m][n] needs to be visually
meaningful to human,
3) The crafted image crftImg[m][n] and target image
dstImg[m′][n′] contain different semantical meanings.
B. The Nearest-neighbor Algorithm and Camouflage Regions
Downscaling algorithms generally do not take specially
crafted “malicious” inputs into consideration when considering
how to extract “sampling” data from input images. Here
we take the simplest scaling algorithm as an example to
demonstrate the downscaling attack.
Figure 3 illustrates the process of converting a 4x4 input
image to the scale of 2x2. In this scaling process, only
one fourth of the input image needs to contain the exact
value of the output image pixels. This scaling process leaves
three quarters of input data under attacker’s control. We call
these areas camouflaging regions. Regardless what values were
stored in these camouflaging regions, the scaling output is the
same. Therefore, all the attackers need to do is to use these
camouflaging regions to create deceiving effect.
Certainly what exact content to put in the camouflage areas
depends on the target image and the deceiving effect the at-
tacker wants to achieve. Currently we are working on software
tools to automatic interleaving pre-captured camouflage images
over a given target image.
C. Parameters and Consideration in Downscaling Attacks
To use downscaling attacks to achieve deceiving effects,
attackers have to consider multiple factors, such as what to
put in the camouflage regions and what size to pick for the
input images.
First, although the early examples of nearest-neighbors
algorithm leave camouflaging regions for attacker to inject
arbitrary data, other scaling algorithms might impose different
constraints. For example, Bilinear scaling algorithms requires
a region’s weighted average pixel values to be equivalent
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Fig. 3: Nearest-neighbor interpolation Illustration.
to the value of a corresponding pixel in the target image.
Nevertheless, even with these constraints, attackers are given
opportunities to provide content that will be partially discarded
by the scaling function. In fact, the sample attack images
in the previous sections are crafted against Bilinear scaling
algorithms, and they can successfully trigger misclassifications
in deep learning applications.
Second, the amount of data controlled by attackers is
proportionally related to the scaling factor. An image that
is much larger than the scale used by deep learning models
generally provides more space for attackers to create deceiving
effect. However, images with extremely uncommon sizes are
likely trigger warnings to users who inspect inputs. Therefore,
attackers need to consider the trade-off between image sizes
and the levels of awkwardness potentially raised by the abnor-
mal sizes.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Practical Challenges for Applying Downscaling Attacks to
Sensor-based Applications
Downscaling attacker certainly only affects applications
that use scaling in the data processing pipeline. It does not
threat applications that only consume data in the same scale
as used by the deep learning models.
Certainly, even resize is used in deep learning applica-
tions, attackers still need to find out ways to inject crafted
inputs in order to generate downscaling attacks. Launching
such attack directly from the analog domain is challenging
but not impossible. Moreover, sensors themselves potentially
can be potentially compromised and malicious sensor inputs
can be generated in those cases to attack the backend deep
learning implementations. In the case of a compromised sensor,
certainly it can directly feed more damaging input to the
backend systems. However, downscaling attacks would still be
preferred because they provide an additional level of deception.
B. Mitigation of Downscaling Attacks
Deep learning application designers have multiple options
to mitigate the risks from downscaling attacks. We have
considered the following possible approaches: 1) limiting the
input size, 2) using robust scaling algorithms, and 3) detecting
dramatic changes from scaling,
The most straightforward way to avoid downscaling attack
is to ignore inputs that do not match the scale used by the
deep learning models. This approach fits well to applications
that deal with input generated by sensor or other applications
control by users. However, as we discussed above, not all
applications can take this solution, and many deep learning
applications often have to deal with input generated (and thus
controlled) by Internet users.
Another possible solution is to adopt a robust scaling
option. Although we have shown that the default scaling
implementation in deep learning frameworks are vulnerable
to downscaling attacks, there are scaling algorithms (such
as Bicubic interpolation) that are more robust in terms of
preserving the content of the original images, and thus are less
vulnerable to attacks. Among the major frameworks we have
inspected, Caffe, TensorFlow, and Torch all allow applications
to choose different scaling algorithms through a parameter of
the resize function.
The third viable solution is to detect dramatic changes in
input features during the scaling process. The downscaling
attack’s deceiving effect is caused by a dramatic change to the
image content before and after the scaling action. Therefore,
applications can potentially detect such attacks by measuring
features that are related to visual presentation. For example, the
color histogram is likely changed in the case that the rescaled
image is dramatically different from the original image.
VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this work is to raise awareness of the
security threats buried in the data processing pipeline in deep
learning applications.
Deep learning applications usually make strong assump-
tions of a uniformed input data scale. All the training and
classification algorithms focus on processing well formatted
data. Although there are situations where data inputs uniformly
match the scale used by the background models, many deep
learning applications (such as image classifications) are un-
avoidable to process data that are in different scales.
Most deep learning frameworks provide scaling and re-
sizing utilities to convert data to the scale used by deep
learning models. This data processing stage is vulnerable to
the downscaling attack presented in this paper. We showed
that attackers can prepare visually deceiving images to deep
learning applications. The result is a mismatch between what
users see and what deep learning applications use. We studied
multiple deep learning frameworks and showed that most of
their default scaling functions are vulnerable to such attack.
We hope our preliminary results in this paper can remind
researchers to not ignore threats in the data processing pipeline
and actively look for ways to detect risks in deep learning
applications.
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APPENDIX
This appendix provides code snippet of deep learning
frameworks using data scaling, and the brief information
related to our experimental setup. All the software implemen-
tation and deep learning model were obtained online without
change.
A. Code snippet of data-scaling used by deep learning frame-
works and applications (The use of resizing or scaling function
are highlighted in red color)
Listing 1: preprocess in label_image of tensorflow
def read_tensor_from_image_file(file_name, input_height=299, input_width=299,
input_mean=0, input_std=255):
input_name = "file_reader"
output_name = "normalized"
file_reader = tf.read_file(file_name, input_name)
if file_name.endswith(".png"):
image_reader = tf.image.decode_png(file_reader, channels = 3,
name=’png_reader’)
elif file_name.endswith(".gif"):
image_reader = tf.squeeze(tf.image.decode_gif(file_reader,
name=’gif_reader’))
elif file_name.endswith(".bmp"):
image_reader = tf.image.decode_bmp(file_reader, name=’bmp_reader’)
else:
image_reader = tf.image.decode_jpeg(file_reader, channels = 3,
name=’jpeg_reader’)
float_caster = tf.cast(image_reader, tf.float32)
dims_expander = tf.expand_dims(float_caster, 0);
resized = tf.image.resize_bilinear(dims_expander, [input_height, input_width])
normalized = tf.divide(tf.subtract(resized, [input_mean]), [input_std])
sess = tf.Session()
result = sess.run(normalized)
return result
Listing 2: preprocess in cppclassification of Caffe
189 void Classifier::Preprocess(const cv::Mat& img,
190 std::vector<cv::Mat>* input_channels) {
191 /* Convert the input image to the input image format of the network. */
192 cv::Mat sample;
193 if (img.channels() == 3 && num_channels_ == 1)
194 cv::cvtColor(img, sample, cv::COLOR_BGR2GRAY);
195 else if (img.channels() == 4 && num_channels_ == 1)
196 cv::cvtColor(img, sample, cv::COLOR_BGRA2GRAY);
197 else if (img.channels() == 4 && num_channels_ == 3)
198 cv::cvtColor(img, sample, cv::COLOR_BGRA2BGR);
199 else if (img.channels() == 1 && num_channels_ == 3)
200 cv::cvtColor(img, sample, cv::COLOR_GRAY2BGR);
201 else
202 sample = img;
203
204 cv::Mat sample_resized;
205 if (sample.size() != input_geometry_)
206 cv::resize(sample, sample_resized, input_geometry_);
207 else
208 sample_resized = sample;
209
210 cv::Mat sample_float;
211 if (num_channels_ == 3)
212 sample_resized.convertTo(sample_float, CV_32FC3);
213 else
214 sample_resized.convertTo(sample_float, CV_32FC1);
215
216 cv::Mat sample_normalized;
217 cv::subtract(sample_float, mean_, sample_normalized);
218
219 /* This operation will write the separate BGR planes directly to the
220 * input layer of the network because it is wrapped by the cv::Mat
221 * objects in input_channels. */
222 cv::split(sample_normalized, *input_channels);
223
224 CHECK(reinterpret_cast<float*>(input_channels->at(0).data)
225 == net_->input_blobs()[0]->cpu_data())
226 << "Input channels are not wrapping the input layer of the network.";
227 }
Listing 3: Imagenet classification with Torch7
function preprocess(im, img_mean)
-- rescale the image
local im3 = image.scale(im,224,224,’bilinear’)
-- subtract imagenet mean and divide by std
for i=1,3 do im3[i]:add(-img_mean.mean[i]):div(img_mean.std[i]) end
return im3
end
Listing 4: Imagenet classification with PyTorch
def main():
global args, best_prec1
args = parser.parse_args()
...
# Data loading code
traindir = os.path.join(args.data, ’train’)
valdir = os.path.join(args.data, ’val’)
normalize = transforms.Normalize(mean=[0.485, 0.456, 0.406],
std=[0.229, 0.224, 0.225])
train_dataset = datasets.ImageFolder(
traindir,
transforms.Compose([
transforms.RandomResizedCrop(224),
transforms.RandomHorizontalFlip(),
transforms.ToTensor(),
normalize,
]))
if args.distributed:
train_sampler = torch.utils.data.distributed.DistributedSampler(train_dataset)
else:
train_sampler = None
train_loader = torch.utils.data.DataLoader(
train_dataset, batch_size=args.batch_size, shuffle=(train_sampler is None),
num_workers=args.workers, pin_memory=True, sampler=train_sampler)
val_loader = torch.utils.data.DataLoader(
datasets.ImageFolder(valdir, transforms.Compose([
transforms.Resize(256),
transforms.CenterCrop(224),
transforms.ToTensor(),
normalize,
])),
batch_size=args.batch_size, shuffle=False,
num_workers=args.workers, pin_memory=True)
Listing 5: code snippnet in deepdetect
int read_file(const std::string &fname)
{
cv::Mat img = cv::imread(fname,_bw ? CV_LOAD_IMAGE_GRAYSCALE :
CV_LOAD_IMAGE_COLOR);
if (img.empty())
{
LOG(ERROR) << "empty image";
return -1;
}
_imgs_size.push_back(std::pair<int,int>(img.rows,img.cols));
cv::Size size(_width,_height);
cv::Mat rimg;
cv::resize(img,rimg,size,0,0,CV_INTER_CUBIC);
_imgs.push_back(rimg);
return 0;
}
B. Software Version and Model Information for Attack Demon-
stration
Here we present the software setup for the attack demon-
stration. Although the example used here targets applications
from the Caffe platform, the risk is not limited to Caffe. We
have tested the scaling functions in Caffe, TensorFlow and
Torch. All of them are vulnerable to downscaling attacks.
The Caffe package and the corresponding image classi-
fication examples were checked-out directly from the offi-
cial GitHub on October 25, 2017, and the OpenCV used
was the latest stable version from the following URL:
https://github.com/opencv/opencv/archive/2.4.13.4.zip
We used the BVLC CaffeNet Model in our proof of concept
exploitation. The model is the result of training based on the
instructions provided by the instruction in the original Caffe
package. To avoid any mistakes in model setup, we download
the model file directly from BVLC’s official GitHub page.
Detail information about the model is provided in the list
below.
Listing 6: Image Classifier Model
name: BAIR/BVLC GoogleNet Model
caffemodel: bvlc_googlenet.caffemodel
caffemodel_url: http://dl.caffe.berkeleyvision.org/bvlc_googlenet.caffemodel
caffe_commit: bc614d1bd91896e3faceaf40b23b72dab47d44f5
C. Command Lines
The downscaling threat was demonstrated based on the
default Caffe example CPPClassification. The exact command
line was shown in the list below.
Listing 7: Image Classification Command Line
./classification.bin models/bvlc_googlenet/deploy.prototxt
models/bvlc_googlenet/bvlc_googlenet.caffemodel
data/ilsvrc12/imagenet_mean.binaryproto
data/ilsvrc12/synset_words.txt
IMAGE_FILE
D. Sample Output
The lists below is the classification results for the sample
images used in the example section.
Listing 8: Sample Classification Results
# wolf-in-sheep.png [Image size: 224*672]
./classification.bin models/bvlc_googlenet/deploy.prototxt
models/bvlc_googlenet/bvlc_googlenet.caffemodel
data/ilsvrc12/imagenet_mean.binaryproto data/ilsvrc12/synset_words.txt
/tmp/sample/wolf-in-sheep.png
---------- Prediction for /tmp/sample/wolf-in-sheep.png ----------
0.8890 - "n02114548 white wolf, Arctic wolf, Canis lupus tundrarum"
0.0855 - "n02120079 Arctic fox, white fox, Alopex lagopus"
0.0172 - "n02134084 ice bear, polar bear, Ursus Maritimus, Thalarctos maritimus"
0.0047 - "n02114367 timber wolf, grey wolf, gray wolf, Canis lupus"
0.0019 - "n02111889 Samoyed, Samoyede"
# wolf.png [Image size: 224*224]
./classification.bin models/bvlc_googlenet/deploy.prototxt
models/bvlc_googlenet/bvlc_googlenet.caffemodel
data/ilsvrc12/imagenet_mean.binaryproto data/ilsvrc12/synset_words.txt
/tmp/sample/wolf.png
---------- Prediction for /tmp/sample/wolf.png ----------
0.8890 - "n02114548 white wolf, Arctic wolf, Canis lupus tundrarum"
0.0855 - "n02120079 Arctic fox, white fox, Alopex lagopus"
0.0172 - "n02134084 ice bear, polar bear, Ursus Maritimus, Thalarctos maritimus"
0.0047 - "n02114367 timber wolf, grey wolf, gray wolf, Canis lupus"
0.0019 - "n02111889 Samoyed, Samoyede"
# cat-in-sheep.png [Image size: 224*672]
./classification.bin models/bvlc_googlenet/deploy.prototxt
models/bvlc_googlenet/bvlc_googlenet.caffemodel
data/ilsvrc12/imagenet_mean.binaryproto data/ilsvrc12/synset_words.txt
/tmp/sample/cat-in-sheep.png
---------- Prediction for /tmp/sample/cat-in-sheep.png ----------
0.1312 - "n02127052 lynx, catamount"
0.1103 - "n02441942 weasel"
0.1068 - "n02124075 Egyptian cat"
0.1000 - "n04493381 tub, vat"
0.0409 - "n04209133 shower cap"
# cat.png [Image size: 224*224]
./classification.bin models/bvlc_googlenet/deploy.prototxt
models/bvlc_googlenet/bvlc_googlenet.caffemodel
data/ilsvrc12/imagenet_mean.binaryproto data/ilsvrc12/synset_words.txt
/tmp/sample/cat.png
---------- Prediction for /tmp/sample/cat.png ----------
0.1312 - "n02127052 lynx, catamount"
0.1103 - "n02441942 weasel"
0.1068 - "n02124075 Egyptian cat"
0.1000 - "n04493381 tub, vat"
0.0409 - "n04209133 shower cap"
